

JPRS 79160

7 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2412

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

7 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2412

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Briefs

- Libya, Iran Arms Deal 1

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Tunisia, Qatar, France Bank Venture Nearing Completion
(8 DAYS, 29 Aug 81)..... 2

ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

- Saudi Paper Interviews Senegalese Official on Afro-Islamic Affairs
(UKAZ, 19 Jul 81)..... 4

ALGERIA

- Bendjedid Seeks To Affirm, Legitimize Authority
(Daniel Junqua; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Aug 81)..... 6
- Veterans' Minister Discusses People-Army Ties
(Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche Interview; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE,
21-27 Aug 81)..... 14
- Veterans' Group Head Stresses Identity, Revolution
(Youcef Yaalaoui Interview; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 21-27 Aug 81). 20
- Energy Cooperation With Japan Outlined
(8 DAYS, 22 Aug 81)..... 23
- Solution to LNG Price Dispute With France Reported Near
(Howard Schissel; 8 DAYS, 29 Aug 81)..... 24
- Briefs
- Talenzane Oil Exploration 25

EGYPT

Two-Part Report on Egyptian Work Force at Home, Abroad (AL-AHRAM, 6, 7 Jul 81).....	26
Court Action Regarding Gen al-Shadhli's Relatives (Husayn al-Habruk; AL-AHRAM, 23 Jul 81).....	36

IRAN

Escalating Terrorism Seen Undermining Khomeyni Rule (Shahpur Haqiqat; LE MONDE, 3 Sep 81).....	38
---	----

ISRAEL

Briefs	
Kibbutz Production Statistics	42
Computer Engineer Shortage	42
Decline in Jewish Population	42
Decline in Investments Reported	43

LEBANON

Palestinian, Lebanese Solidarity Conference Opens (AN-NAHAR, 11 Sep 81).....	44
---	----

LIBYA

Oil for Goods Barter Deal With India (THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 29 Aug 81).....	47
Briefs	
Ten Airbuses Purchased	48
Aid to Nicaragua	48

MOROCCO

King Hassan's Policies Examined (8 DAYS, 22 Aug 81).....	49
---	----

SUDAN

Briefs	
Libyan Emergency Reports Denied	51

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

LIBYA, IRAN ARMS DEAL--Iran is conducting negotiations with Libya on an agreement for the supply of a considerable amount of military equipment, our military correspondent Roni Daniyel reports. Iran's foreign minister, who is taking part in the rejection states' meeting in Bengazi, is seeking Libyan agreement to supply his country with arms, spare parts and ammunition. It is reported from Bengazi that there was an incident between the meeting's host, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, and the Iranian foreign minister--after which the Iranian delegation walked out of the meeting. [Text] [TA180730 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 18 Sep 81]

CSO: 4423/2

TUNISIA, QATAR, FRANCE BANK VENTURE NEARING COMPLETION

London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 pp 36-37

[Text] TUNISIA EXPECTS that tripartite banking schemes involving France and the Gulf states will play a major role in financing investment during its sixth Five Year Plan (1982-1986). The first venture — with Qatar as the Gulf participant — is nearing completion, and multinational development banks with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also envisaged.

The document officially establishing the Banque Arabe Francaise Internationale (BAFI) will be signed in Tunis by representatives from Tunisia, France and Qatar either in late September or early October. The bank's initial capital has been set at Tunisian dinars 250m (\$481m) with Tunisia providing 40 per cent, France 30 per cent and Qatar the remainder.

BAFI will be headed by a Tunisian, with Paris and Doha each appointing a deputy vice president. Major decisions need a 75 per cent majority, so all partners in the venture automatically have the power of veto.

The bank will assist the financing of important investment schemes in industry, agriculture and tourism. In addition, BAFI will be able to go to the euromarkets for medium to long term credits, and open up branches outside Tunisia.

When the idea of the bank was first mooted in June 1980 by Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali, Iraq was chosen as the Arab partner because of its close ties with France. However, the Gulf war forced Baghdad to withdraw from the venture. Invitations to take Iraq's place were sent to most oil-producing Gulf states, but Qatar was a favourite because of its close relations with France.

Then the Tunisians had to overcome the intransigence of the French state-controlled bank, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), which was tipped to be the major French participant in the banking consortium. BNP negotiators insisted that the new

multinational bank should specialise in financing French projects in Tunisia. This was unacceptable to Tunisian bankers, who want the new institution to be free to choose its projects and clients.

BNP also insisted that the French funds frozen in Tunisia since the country's independence in 1956 should be incorporated into BAFI's capital. As far as the Tunisian government was concerned, the question of the French funds was a matter for direct discussion between Paris and Tunis, and in the event talks with BNP were suspended.

During Premier Mzali's visit to Paris last February, the government of former president Giscard d'Estaing suggested that as a compromise Credit Agricole, another state-controlled bank, should take BNP's place.

Two months later in Doha, the Tunisian premier cemented the tripartite arrangement. The election of President Francois Mitterrand has not changed France's intention to go ahead with the venture and this was confirmed by Minister of External Affairs Claude Cheysson during his brief trip to Tunis in July.

Nonetheless, problems could develop with the Qatari end of the deal. The Doha government is worried about the inclusion of communist ministers in the new French cabinet, and the Qataris have reportedly withdrawn funds from French banks.

government is worried about the inclusion of communist ministers in the new French cabinet, and the Qataris have reportedly withdrawn funds from French banks.

The success of BAFI and other multinational banks, as well as the existing offshore banking units (OBUs) depends on the promised liberalisation of the country's banking legislation. The Banque Centrale de Tunisie (BCT) exercises total control over the 12 local commercial banks, limiting their foreign exchange dealings.

The activities of the fledgling OBU sector has been substantially curtailed by tight limits on profit margins in Tunisia, and as a result foreign operators prefer to go elsewhere. The four banks that set up OBUs in Tunis under the 1976 law — Citibank, the Bank of America, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and the French-based Union Tunisienne de Banques (UTB) — have so far reported disappointing results.

CSO: 4500/1

SAUDI PAPER INTERVIEWS SENEGALESE OFFICIAL ON AFRO-ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 19 Jul 81 p 6

[Article on interview with Mustapha Sisi, Senegal's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Executive Committee Chairman of the African Council for Islamic Coordination, by 'UKAZ: "An Afro-Islamic Conference Before Year's End to Discuss Affairs of the Islamic Message and Important Economic Projects"; date and place not specified]

[Text] An Afro-Islamic conference will be held before the end of 1981, under the auspices of the Muslim World League (MWL) in Mecca and the African Council for Islamic Coordination (ACIC) in Dakar, to discuss affairs of [preaching] the Islamic Message in the African continent.

This was announced by His Excellency Mustapha Sisi, Senegal's ambassador to the Kingdom and ACIC Executive Committee Chairman, who explained in his interview with 'UKAZ the council's task and its Islamic role on the African level.

He also talked about the council's activities. During the course of the interview, he lauded efforts exerted by the government of His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd Al-'Aziz in helping the Islamic countries and offering moral and financial support to the Islamic organizations in the African continent to enable them to carry out their work.

Commenting on the establishment of the ACIC and its tasks, Mustapha Sisi said at the beginning of the interview:

"The African Council for Islamic Coordination is a fully independent body, for it is not a political body at all. The council was established through an initiative by the MWL, which saw that the Islamic organizations in Africa are many and spread throughout the African continent and that they work toward the achievement of one aim. Therefore, the League called for convening an African conference in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. The conference, which comprised not less than 500 Islamic personalities, was attended by all the Islamic organizations in Africa. After discussions lasting two days, the conferees realized that it is necessary to have a coordinating body for the Islamic organizations, whose function is to coordinate, plan and create means of cooperation among these organizations, so that they will carry out their tasks of directing Muslims, in a true Islamic way, and preach the Islamic Message with all means available.

"Thus, this Islamic council was born in Nouakchott five years ago; it was chosen to be headquartered in Dakar, Senegal's capital. After that the council's executive committee was formed; I was elected its chairman. I am still in this position."

His excellency added:

"I remember that the current Senegalese President, His Excellency Abdou Diouf, who was a prime minister then, opened the first meeting of the executive committee in Dakar, with the attendance of the MWL secretary general and his assistants."

What will the coming meeting discuss?

On the council's forthcoming meeting, Sesi said: "We are about to convene an Islamic conference in Senegal before the end of this year, 1981, to discuss the affairs of the Islamic Message and the problems of Muslims, in order to work out adequate solutions for them. I had earlier held a meeting with the MWL Secretary General Shaykh Safwat Al-Saqqa to discuss this issue."

"The forthcoming Afro-Islamic conference will also discuss the creation of important economic projects benefiting Muslims and enabling them to carry out their duties of establishing hospitals, Islamic cultural centers, and schools for teaching Koran, religious sciences and sciences of the modern world, since the ideal Muslim should be aware of all the sciences which are of benefit to man."

The Kingdom Supports the Council.

On the Islamic countries' support for the ACIC, Mustapha Sisi said: "As a matter of fact, until now the council has not received moral support from some governments. However, it has received financial support from the Government of Saudi Arabia, which always supports Muslims."

"There is a cadre at the headquarters in Dakar; the employees of this body receive their salaries from the MWL. As I said, the council, until now, has been shouldering the responsibility of direction and coordination among the Islamic organizations; it functions as a link among them. It sends preachers and lecturers to African countries and distributes books to the organizations belonging to it."

"It is noteworthy that several national councils have been established. As you know the continent is divided into four parts: the North, South, East and West. Therefore, there is a national council in each of the four African regions. There are also national councils in each Islamic country. For example, there is a national federation for the local associations in Senegal; it comprises 35 associations, whose aim is to spread and teach the Arabic language since it is the language of Koran, religious education and the true Islamic Message. These 35 associations are spread in West Africa, where Senegal is a link between the Western Arab countries and the African countries."

BENDJEDID SEEKS TO AFFIRM, LEGITIMIZE AUTHORITY

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "The Necessary Rearrangement of Choices in Algeria"]

[Text] The replacement of great men is always difficult. This is particularly the case when it takes place in an atmosphere of legality and in the name of continuity. The succession to the late President Houari Boumediene is no exception to the rule. In a period of 30 months since his death the shadow of the man who made a deep mark on the Algerian revolution and who fashioned the structure of the state has disappeared a little. Prominent visitors are certainly still invited to come and bow before his tomb. The present chief of state himself paid Boumediene this homage on 5 July, on the occasion of the 19th anniversary of independence. However, the press only rarely mentions his name and only occasionally makes reference to his speeches or to what he did. The anniversary of the "revolutionary rectification" of 19 June 1965, an expression approved by official speeches to mark the coup d'etat against Ben Bella, is celebrated with a growing discretion. Ben Bella himself has regained his freedom after 14 years of imprisonment.

If the memory of Boumediene is blurring, his successor as Algerian chief of state, President Chadli Bendjedid, has to fight no less hard a battle to impose his authority in a real sense. His designation as the candidate of the FLN Party, by a unanimous vote of the party congress in January, 1979, as well as his election as president the following week, with 99.51 percent of the valid ballots, should leave no illusions. The chief of state, in fact, was imposed on the country by the army at the end of a negotiation between two of the closest associates of the dead president, the minister of foreign affairs, Abdel-aziz Bouteflika, coordinator of the FLN, and Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui.

Will President Chadli Bendjedid be "picked up" by one of the clans which have just engaged in a ferocious dispute over power? Will he be, and for how long, a transitional president, managing the crisis and cooling off the clashes? On the contrary, will he succeed in affirming his authority? These are the questions which were raised in the aftermath of his election. Two and one-half years afterwards, and half-way through the presidential term, the last-mentioned hypothesis seems to be the right one, even if nothing has been definitely decided.

The task was all the more difficult for the new president, who was not prepared for it. When the Army appealed to him, Col Chadli commanded the Military Region of Oran. Moreover, it was in this capacity that he was included in the Council of the

Revolution in 1965, a body established by Boumediene to lead the country. He played no major political role in it and did not appear to have been given any particular mission. He never emerged from the performance of his military tasks, which no doubt won him the particular confidence of the army. He is not an ideologue, like his predecessor, but on the contrary is a pragmatist. Coming from a modest background, he is oriented to a popular form of Islam as well as to traditional values. His service in the Algerian War, his contact with poor farmers despoiled or exploited by colonialism sowed in him a certain demand for social justice which seems to relate more to morality than to political analysis.

He will have a tendency to model Algeria in his own image. He had to respect the fragile balances which came out of the party congress, and he needed to assemble his own team "as he went," by progressively eliminating certain men occupying responsible positions in order to bring others into them. This effort was all the more difficult since Bouteflika and Yahiaoui paid only lip service to his authority, as is the case, moreover, with the Boumediene old guard which is watching the strategic points of the state and, in particular, as it holds the Directorate of Military Security, the real political police of the regime.

The new chief of state must finally take into account, in the course of his activities, another constraint which serves him and annoys him at the same time: the need to reaffirm the continuity of the Algerian revolution, which has been elevated to the rank of a real myth. This myth is essential since it is the basis for the legitimacy of the present leadership team. It is therefore necessary to avoid anything which could appear as a rupture with the past. President Chadli is consequently required to exercise prudence in the face of his adversaries. However, the consensus in favor of legality and respect for established institutions works to his benefit in the sense that the Constitution gives him very extensive powers.

Safeguarded Powers

The first "victory" of the president consisted precisely in keeping these powers in their entirety, as they were at the time of the constitutional reform of 30 June 1979. There were many who suggested a revision of these powers in a more collegial direction. They were not supported. The length of the presidential term has, of course, been reduced from 7 to 5 years in order to match the periods between party congresses. However, the chief of state and secretary general of the FLN continues to preside over the government and to lead the army, since he holds the defense portfolio. The constitutional reform required him to designate a prime minister. However, the latter has only limited powers, "delegated" by the president of the republic, who remains the chief of government. The new constitutional text finally opens the possibility of naming one or several vice presidents, which has aroused considerable speculation. However, these posts have remained vacant, and the collegial procedure preached in the name of a "return to the sources" of the FLN, but which in fact was no doubt aimed at limiting the powers of the chief of state, has remained a dead letter.

Beyond the letter of the Constitution, Chadli Bendjedid had to confront men, and more particularly his two "rivals," Bouteflika and Yahiaoui. To tell the truth, the fate of the former figure was almost arranged already. Even if everything was

done so that it would not appear clearly at the time, the former leader of Algerian diplomacy was the big loser at the fourth congress of the FLN in January, 1979. At the end of the sessions of the congress he was certainly made a member of the political bureau which succeeded to the already dissolved Council of the Revolution. He was even a member of the government. However, as a minister counselor of the president, he had no grasp on any of the machinery of the state. He would henceforth attend government meetings very rarely.

In Algiers Bouteflika is openly described as the leader of the right wing, favoring the liberalization of the economy. That hardly does him justice. Certainly, Bouteflika has a considerable awareness of the inadequacies of the ultracentralized economic system established by Belaid Abdesselam and his team, its gaps, the blockages to which it led, its excessive cost, and the dependence on the West which it involved. He spoke out for a return to economic realism. He wanted to break up the bureaucratic choker around the economy and give more room to investment and to private initiative. President Chadli and his advisers say the same thing today. However, Bouteflika did not question the socialist choice already made and the dominant role of the state. In addition, for 15 years he was the incarnation of a foreign policy oriented to the support of liberation movements, non-alignment, and the establishment of a new international economic order. The Western countries, and particularly France, know to what extent he was a difficult and critical opposite number. Concerned with modernism and progress, including on the social plane and in the area of morals, more turned toward the Mediterranean than toward the Arab Middle East, he no doubt attracted the enmity and the hate of the Muslim fundamentalists.

However, in January, 1979, Bouteflika above all paid for his contacts with Boumediene, of whom he had appeared to be the designated successor for a long time. He also paid for his belonging to the "oujda group," whose most celebrated members, in addition to himself, are Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem, Tayebi Larbi, and Kaid Ahmed. The ranks of this clan had thinned out over the years, but, as an expression of the power of Western Algeria, it had attracted, in a country where regional passions are still very strong, a substantial amount of animosity on the part of men from Eastern Algeria, who clearly intended to take their revenge. Bouteflika, whose activity as a result of his position took place mostly outside the country, had no serious support in the state apparatus or in the army. He had lost from the beginning. His recent elimination from the political bureau only culminated a defeat which had been largely achieved after the fourth congress of the FLN and which was only revealed in stages for appearances' sake.

The elimination of Colonel Yahiaoui was not so easy. This 50-year old colonel enjoyed and still enjoys solid support in the party and among the military. Charged by Boumediene in 1977 with democratizing and dynamizing the FLN, he seemed to have succeeded in this task, initially bringing new men into the leadership of the mass organizations. The trade union members and the young people, above all, had confidence in him. As the former director of the military academy at Cherchell from 1969 to 1977, he had "Algerianized" this institution and had committed it in part to the retraining of former guerrillas, who were thus able to find a place in the army and were grateful to him for it. This man from the high plateaus--he was born in eastern Algeria in a modest family, like Boumediene--presents himself as one pledged to continue the work of the late president. His reputation for great integrity does not seem to be exaggerated. Resolutely socialist, he wants to establish the regime on popular bases and renovate the party by purging it of its opportunist or corrupt elements. This former taleb (teacher in a Koranic

school) is a convinced supporter of the process of Arabization--moreover, he himself has some difficulty in expressing himself in French--and of the Arab-Islamic traditions. For the lack of a better example, he could be defined as a "progressive Muslim."

The support which the Algerian communists gave him--whose support he accepted and appreciated, like the support he had from Moscow--were both skillfully exploited in January, 1979, to disqualify him in the eyes of the army. Anti-communism is one of the most tested tactics of Algerian political life. The officer corps preferred Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, but the latter had to take Colonel Yahiaoui into account and negotiate with him the composition of the Central Committee of the party, where the one who appeared as the leader of the left wing had brought in a number of his friends. As a member of the political bureau, he kept the task of party coordinator.

For nearly 18 months, from February, 1979, to June, 1980, Algeria therefore had a two-headed government. The accent was placed on the FLN, whose central apparatus was considerably strengthened and which saw an absolute primacy recognized for itself in the definition of directions for the country and the control of their application. Large committees provided with extensive powers were established for this purpose. Although, by virtue of the Constitution he incarnated the combined leadership of the party and the state, the president of the republic in fact did not control the FLN.

However, the latter remained paralyzed by personal quarrels and factional conflicts, as well as by the weight of a bureaucracy concerned above all with preserving its privileges. The party was to show its weakness, its inability to maintain a grasp on events, first in December, 1979, at the time of a long strike by students demanding the immediate Arabization of the entire administration. Then later, during the spring of 1980, at the time of the development of the Berber cultural conflict, which was to attain its culminating point in April, with the riots in Tizi-Ouzou.

There was nothing surprising, therefore, that Colonel Yahiaoui was accused before the Central Committee in June, 1980. The party had allegedly failed in its task of education and training of the masses. It did not have them under control. Not only had the coordinator not known how to maintain order, the first and permanent concern among the military, but also he was suspected of having encouraged disorder by supporting the students favoring immediate Arabization in a hidden way and by provoking the Kabyles of eastern Algeria in order to be able to repress them later. The Central Committee was called on by the spokesmen of the army to recognize the full and entire authority of the chief of state. He was forced to bow before what certain persons would not hesitate calling "a real coup d'etat." The post of party coordinator was abolished, as were the large committees. The fact that Colonel Yahiaoui was kept in the political bureau, a political bureau moreover reduced to the role of a figurehead, had no other purpose, once again, than managing the transition. The last stage was reached at the time of the reorganization of the political bureau on 2 July 1981, which involved the simultaneous departure from it of two former pretenders to the succession to the president. This was a false kind of symmetry tending to diminish what was felt by the left wing to be a new defeat.

For the progressive Algerians the evolution of the regime to the right is less and less a matter of doubt. However, there are few who challenge the need to rearrange the choices made by Abdesselam's team and to make corrections in the system which he established. The proposals put forward in this regard by Abdelhamid Brahim, minister of planning and national development, a very close associate of the chief of state whose economic and social policy he inspires, seemed the only ones capable of restoring a badly damaged situation. The choice in favor of massive industrialization involved the formation of a modern industrial sector bringing together 17 ultracentralized, national companies employing 350,000 workers. Their low level of productivity was as shocking as the fact that they needed colossal investments, consuming the largest proportion of the oil revenues of the country and even mortgaging future petroleum income because of the size of the debt incurred. This unambiguous choice certainly had some positive effects, particularly in the matter of jobs, but it also led to the sacrifice of an agricultural system which, moreover, was not without advantages. It further led to financial and technological dependence on the industrialized countries and to the neglect of the essential needs of a population which, with one of the highest growth rates in the world, has already doubled in 20 years. In a society which is rapidly becoming urban and where the conditions of daily life are hard--a dramatic shortage of housing, inadequate urban equipment, frequent shortages of water, chronic inflation, lack of adequate distribution systems, bureaucratic problems--managers and workers in industry are privileged figures, thanks to the application of an advanced social policy in this sector. These advantages--dispensaries and private medical service, higher salaries, canteens, distribution cooperatives, vacation camps for children--may appear modest, compared to those of Western workers. However, the other Algerian workers, and especially those in the administration, look at these advantages as so many instances of inequality, all the less justified since they are not the result, in general, of higher productivity but are financed by petroleum receipts.

It is therefore necessary to re-establish the broken equilibrium: to restore elementary economic principles, such as the law of supply and demand, the link between salaries and productivity, encouragement of individual initiative by providing a minimum profit, at least, in commerce. The government is trying to do that, but it has made certain choices in that direction--decentralization, restructuring companies, reducing the range of salaries, unification of the sanitary services--which have aroused misunderstanding, distrust, and even the hostility of officials who have often given the best of themselves for years and accept, only with difficulty, seeing their work and their methods questioned. The trials of some of them for mismanagement, which have been concluded in some cases by an acquittal pure and simple, have not been likely to dissipate their reservations toward the government effort. Quite the contrary. As for the workers, they have decided to protect their "achievements" and are less and less hesitant to launch "wildcat" strikes. These have occurred on many occasions in the last few months and at times have been repressed with violence.

The "progressives," and among them the communists of the Socialist Avant-Garde Party (PAGS) in fact suspect the chief of state of wanting to empty the socialist choice made by the country of all its meaning and of only keeping its appearances under the pretext of wanting to carry out reforms. They point out as evidence the measures taken against them to eliminate them from positions of responsibility in the mass organizations, and particularly in the trade unions. To counter the influence

of the communists in the government enterprises, the FLN party is establishing cells there which complete with the affiliates of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA). This offensive has developed particularly since the appointment in June, 1980, of Messaadia, an old hand in the FLN apparatus, to the post of permanent secretary of the Central Committee. He is a determined opponent of Colonel Yahiaoui. The zeal shown by Messaadia has not gone for nothing, but quite the contrary, since he was promoted in July, 1981, to the political bureau.

The Influence of the Progressives

The influence of the progressives no doubt would be greater if, since 1970 and the launching of the agrarian revolution, they had not "stuck" to the regime under a policy of "critical support" in order, they say, "to be in a position to influence the choices it makes." Thus they have taken on themselves the heavy responsibility of cautioning against the building of a system of state capitalism imposed from above without much consideration for the economic and social realities and without real participation by the people. As a result, they can hardly appear as a credible alternative in the face of difficulties of the present situation. However, how can one fail to understand their concern over the rising force of Muslim extremist currents which seem to have an influence even within the very center of the government? It is not so much the construction of mosques throughout the whole country which is in question as the strong social and political pressure exerted more and more openly by those who are called, for convenience, the "Muslim brothers." Having recourse to violence without hesitation, the latter are opening prayer rooms in administrative offices, in factories, in the universities. In the university faculties they do not shrink from real commando operations against young men suspected of "Marxism," whether or not they are members of the very officially approved Nation Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA). It happens that some of the latter have been dragged before improvised "popular tribunals" to answer for their "crimes." The "Muslim brothers" sometimes take hotel bars or merchants selling alcoholic beverages as their targets. They visit families and advise parents to dress their daughters in clothing presented as the only kind conforming to the precepts of religion: a long, flowing, dull-colored dress leaving nothing uncovered except the eyes, and without any kind of make-up. A matter of conviction? Family pressure? A desire thus to be sure of peace in public places in this way, or is it even a wish to follow a new style which may at times be attractive? In any case the "Muslim sisters," to use a popular expression, are more and more numerous in the streets of the large cities, even if the phenomenon remains very much restricted to a minority. A more serious matter is the fact that one sees an expansion in the number of so-called "wild" mosques which are not under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and where it is not unusual to hear the Imams question, sometimes in violent terms, the government and the socialist option. One often hears it said, "Boumediene would never have permitted that." The massive industrialization program, the exodus from the rural areas, the development of the school system, the contact with the West and, above all, with France through emigrants but also through French volunteers, have profoundly overturned a society already traumatized by the liberation war. The traditional structures, and especially the families, have broken into pieces, like the values which they carried with them. For a number of disoriented young people Islam appears to be a solution or at least a refuge. The leaders are aware of this and use it, with more or less success, in controlling this "deep wave" which is breaking on the

whole Muslim world, from Tehran to Rabat. They do not hesitate before a certain kind of auctioning process. "We have no Islamic lessons to learn from anyone," President Chadli Bendjedid likes to repeat. Since his coming to power he has already gone to Mecca twice. And recently he went as far as stating before the Central Committee, "Our ideology is Islam."

Facing the Rise of the Islamic Current

Such views are a matter of concern for the defenders of the socialist option. What kind of Islam are they talking about, in fact? The statements made by the minister of religious affairs, Abderrahmane Chibane, on 3 July 1981 on the occasion of the beginning of Ramadan, are not of a kind likely to reassure them. He said, "Whoever denies the obligatory character of fasting may be sentenced to death. His body will neither be washed, nor wrapped in a shroud, nor buried in a Muslim cemetery. Regarding those who recognize the obligatory character of fasting but do not repeat it, they are liable to corporal punishment, imprisonment, and being deprived of food and water." Such punishments are in no way provided for by Algerian law, which respects freedom of conscience, even if Algerian law proclaims Islam to be the religion of the state. And, coming from a member of the government, this kind of speech risks being considered by some people as an encouragement to take justice into their own hands. Perhaps an even more revealing fact is that the same minister stated, at the 14th seminar on Islamic thought in September, 1980, "Nationalism is impotent by itself in providing the matrix for cultural behavior... It is certainly out of an awareness of this fact that President Chadli Bendjedid sought to re-establish a hierarchy of values by placing faith in God above any other allegiance."

Some people ask themselves therefore if the Algerian revolution has not entered on the path to a "petty bourgeois Islamic socialism," which would have for its principal characteristics the development of the middle classes through access to property and the encouragement of the private sector; the satisfaction of a thirst for consumption by massive recourse to imports; the application of distributive social justice, as Islam denies the existence of classes; the exaltation of traditional values and socio-cultural practices, particularly as they concern the status of women; finally, the struggle against foreign ideologies and cultural influences, whose "harmfulness" is frequently denounced by a newspaper like CHAAB, an Algiers daily newspaper published in Arabic.

Would such an evolution of the regime be enough to hold off the pressure of Muslim fundamentalists by joining them, a pressure which manifests itself in the country in a way which still seems confused and which seems to find many sources of finance outside the country. This is not clear, as the Muslim fundamentalists are finding in the shortcomings of Algerian society, and particularly in the development of social inequalities, choice arguments for their propaganda. On the other hand such an orientation would apparently complete the rupture with the Muslim or marxist "progressives." Some 20 years after independence was achieved, when new generations are appearing who did not know colonialism, the nationalist unanimity of the Algerian revolution seems to be undergoing a rude test. Encouraged by the climate of relative freedom of expression which has been established in place of the struggle of rival clans for the control of the government, the ideological debate is going on at full force, and the notion of a single front, until now maintained against any kind of pressure, might well not survive a radicalization of these struggles.

"L'Algerie:" an educational publication in which the presentation of the principal contemporary aspects of Algerian development (population, industry, agriculture, transportation, urbanization, schools) is illustrated by a series of 21 photographs with commentary. A summary sets out the essential characteristics of the country in the geographic, demographic, and economic areas. (La Documentation Francaise, in "La Documentation Photographique" series, No 6,054, August, 1981, F 24, 124 Rue H Barbusse, 93308 Aubervilliers Cedex)

5170

CSO: 4519/53

VETERANS' MINISTER DISCUSSES PEOPLE-ARMY TIES

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 913, 21-27 Aug 81 pp 12-16

[Interview with Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, minister of veterans, on the occasion of the celebration of the national holiday of 20 August, commemorating the general offensive of 20 August 1955, by Y O M, a REVOLUTION AFRICAINE staff correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of 20 August, Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, member of the Central Committee and minister of veterans, has given us an interview in which he recalls for us the meaning of this date and the situation in society in which those who achieved our national liberation find themselves.

[Question] The date of 20 August 1981 brings back to us 26 years of struggle, effort, and sacrifices made by the veterans who provided the impulse for the armed and social revolution undertaken and continued by the nation. What significance and what importance should be attached to the celebration of this anniversary?

[Answer] Just one year after the beginning of our struggle for independence, a memorable date was to be engraved in history forever. This was the date of 20 August, a date which will remain historic and essential to the history of the Algerian revolution, since it is the concrete expression of the solidarity and the intimate alliance of the people with their army. The armed offensive of 20 August 1955, by its material and human sacrifices, proved to the enemy that the Algerian revolution had been organized on the military plane. The Soummam Congress of 20 August 1956, a natural extension of this historic date, was to establish the political bases of a revolution engaged in liberating the country.

[Question] Could you recall for the younger generation the impact and the historic framework in which this event took place and its repercussions in the Arab world and the African continent?

[Answer] The breadth of the revolution, both in national as well as international terms, made it imperative to define a political program. Thus it was that on 20 August 1956 the Soummam Congress adopted a political-military platform which, in addition to bringing the general situation up to date, consolidated the organization of the struggle and set it up in coherent form both within the country as well as

abroad. The Algerian revolution, which had become a reality difficult for the colonial power to conquer, forced the latter to adopt a new colonial strategy to break the will of the people. By granting autonomy to Tunisia and Morocco it sought to concentrate all its forces in Algeria.

[Question] Still in the same context, could you recall for us the conditions in which the Soummam Congress was held and set out for us again its objectives and the principal results achieved?

[Answer] The Soummam Congress was a necessity which was felt by all of our soldiers. It was the faith animating the soldiers. The need to drive out the occupying power imposed on those engaged in the revolution not only an armed struggle but also the organization of that struggle.

Thus it was that on the political-military plane the ALN [National Liberation Army] was to consolidate the unity of its strategy by the planning and coordination of ways and means to be adopted to achieve the liquidation of the colonial system.

Regarding domestic objectives, the congress aimed at the mobilization and organization of all the healthy energies of the Algerian people in order to achieve the liquidation of the colonial system.

The external objectives included:

- the internationalization of the Algerian problem.
- the achievement of North African unity in its natural, Arab-Muslim framework.
- within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the expression of our active sympathy toward all nations which would support our liberation struggle.

In order to achieve the objectives listed above, the congress provided for a re-organization of the existing Algerian structures, as follows:

- I) Organization of the Army;
 - a) Organization of the command structure
 - b) Organization of the wilaya [province] structure
 - 1) A political and military leader (rank of colonel)
 - 2) A military deputy (rank of major)
 - 3) A political deputy (rank of major)
 - 4) A deputy charged with coordination, information, and intelligence (rank of major)
- II) Organization of combat units
 - a) The battalion
 - b) The katiba [company]
 - c) The section
 - d) The group
- III) Administrative organization
 - a) Health service
 - b) Equipment service
 - c) Liaison service
 - d) Intelligence service
 - e) Financial service
 - f) War materiel service
 - g) Press and information service

[Question] It would be useful to recall the organization of the FLN and the ALN, established by those who are now veterans. Also, from 1 November 1954 to 20 August 1955, what were the principal stages experienced by our revolution?

[Answer] The beginning of the armed struggle on 1 November 1954 was an outcome of the revolutionary dynamism of the Algerian people. Thus, the general offensive of 20 August 1955 proved unquestionably that the Algerian revolution was not a revolt of an anarchical, localized character, without coordination, without political leadership, and doomed to failure. Rather, it was a true revolution, organized, national and popular in character, and led by an army capable of guiding it to final victory.

Although the beginning of the armed struggle was carried on with a variety of weapons, it was due to the effective organization of the ALN, which was formed progressively, that the combat soldiers were able to go through several important stages:

- Repair of weapons obtained from a variety of sources.
- Picking up many weapons seized from the enemy in the course of combat.
- Local manufacture of certain munitions (grenades, bombs, etc).

[Question] Today, the veterans are part of the active forces of the nation. Their responsibility is total in passing the ideological, political, and revolutionary torch to the younger generation. In this connection what are the actions taken by your ministry to complete writing the history of the armed revolution?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the survival of peoples is conditioned by the survival of their history and by their glorification of their heroes' grandeur. The Algerian people have suffered martyrdom in all its forms, including that form which consisted of burying its history. This would have succeeded, had it not been for the vigilance of its sons who gave the best of themselves to seize our freedom. For this reason it is essential to record and to describe all the events relating to our liberation struggle. This must be done to record in concrete form the firm will of our people, expressed clearly in this sense in the National Charter. This noble mission is incumbent on the present generation, from which, more than from any other, it is demanded that it describe the price of our historic patrimony, which will constitute the message to be transmitted to future generations.

In this sense, in the institutional framework, within the Ministry of Veterans there is a Directorate of Historical Research, whose objective is to stimulate and to encourage the taste for research among the younger generation, which did not have the occasion to experience the war of liberation.

Historical research is a matter for everyone. Nevertheless, for the present the Ministry of Veterans has undertaken a large-scale, nationwide effort for the construction of regional museums, commemorative markers, monuments and restoration of historical places connected with the war of national liberation, construction of cemeteries for the fallen [chouhada]. In addition, campaigns for the collection of documents, objects, personal effects, statements related to the liberation struggle are carried on regularly. Elsewhere, it is appropriate to recall the reconstruction of the National Veterans' Museum established to preserve this form of our national, historical patrimony.

To complete this whole historical chapter, it has been decided to give priority to establish a complete national collection of monographs on the liberation war. In the future the Ministry of Veterans will recommend in particular:

- establishment of a commission which will have the role of preparing a textbook on the history of the national liberation war, to be included in educational programs.
- encouragement of researchers to take in hand the writing of history.
- establishment of a commission charged with encouraging and considering the correctness of film production on this subject.
- organization of seminars and competitions on the different themes of the liberation struggle.

[Question] Regarding social action and reintegrating veterans into national life, could you give us an overall picture of the different forms of action undertaken on behalf of the veterans?

[Answer] The social protection of the veterans and their heirs, recognized and provided for in the basic laws in effect in this country, has been accomplished by many and varied actions undertaken by our ministry. The different measures taken up to the present are included in a policy of social action aimed at improving the living conditions of the veterans and their heirs.

For example, we can give some figures to provide a better appreciation of the impact of these different actions:

--in 1981 alone the sum of 1.7 billion Algerian dinars has been allocated solely for pensions, as a consequence of the relatively recent decision on the indexation of pensions to the guaranteed minimum wage.

--in the area of jobs more than 71,000 persons have been provided employment in different sectors, divided as follows:

- a) public sector: 25,000 people.
- b) economic and industrial sector: 45,000 people.
- c) agricultural sector: 11,000.

--licenses distributed up to the present are as follows:

- a) taxi licenses: 14,648
- b) tobacco store licenses: 10,063.
- c) alcoholic beverage licenses: 6,535.
- d) provision of commercial premises: 2,163.
- e) transportation routes in rural areas: 170.
- f) yellow cards: 185.

--provision of loans: loans for the veterans and their heirs have been extended in several phases:

- a) 1969 program: this involved 638 veterans. The sectors concerned included the commercial sector (495 loans); the industrial sector (80 loans); the transportation sector (large trucks: 7; small trucks: 1); the animal husbandry sector (37 loans); the agricultural sector (18 loans).
- b) 1974 program: this program involved 718 veterans. It would be appropriate to distinguish between loans allocated for the purchase of trucks and loans provided for veterans who invested in different sectors of activity. These sectors included the commercial sector (7 loans); the industrial sector (21 loans); loans for the purchase of large trucks (403); loans for the purchase of small trucks (287).
- c) the loan program which has been progressively applied since 1969 has provided 1,356 loans whose total value up to the present is 1,311,631,550 Algerian dinars.

Beside the programs directly linked with the improvement of the living conditions of veterans and their heirs, there are also other programs which have been carried out at other levels, such as:

- a) medical-social action: three centers for providing artificial limbs for wounded veterans were established in 1966 in Algiers, Stif, and Wahran. These centers provide prosthetic and orthopedic devices, as well as accessories and repair services. As an illustration, these centers in 1980 distributed more than 9,914 orthopedic shoes and devices. Four rest homes established in Guelma, Hammam Righa, Hammam Bouhadjar, and Saida provide for the reception, housing, and treatment of 1,500 veterans per year. Widows of soldiers killed during the liberation war [chahid] travel free of charge on the entire domestic transportation network.
- b) training and orientation: following independence the problem relative to the care of the children of our martyrs [chouhada] became acute. To deal with this situation the state established 54 orphan asylums charged with providing education and schools for more than 10,000 children. Considering the rapid evolution of the age pyramid of these young children, beginning in 1974 different forms of action have been undertaken to provide for the orientation and placement in educational and training institutions in order to place them later in the economic and social life of the country. These young people continue to benefit from several advantages, such as clothing, school supplies, and follow-up teacher assistance. Further, five training centers for the traditional arts (CFAT) were progressively established, beginning in 1973, in order to provide for the training of our martyrs' children and for veterans who failed to pass through the regular school system. These centers at present provide for training in the following disciplines: design and decoration, sculpture and wood-carving, ceramics, embroidery, cutting and sewing tapestry. These different centers, up to the present, have trained more than 1,700 students, who have received diplomas in the areas noted above. The training program is not limited to the children of our martyrs but is also extended to veterans, since the latter have priority of admission in training programs organized by companies by which they are employed. They also have priority to undertake higher studies through special sessions.

[Question] What prospects can be foreseen for veterans and their heirs in terms of pensions, jobs, training, and medical care?

[Answer] Although praiseworthy efforts have been made to clear up all applications for pensions, it is nonetheless true that a substantial number of applications remain to be acted on. In view of this situation and considering the advanced age of our veterans, the Ministry of Veterans is presently undertaking short term action: --consideration and rapid and definitive action taken on pending applications. --in clearing up these cases inquiry committees have been set up at the regional and provincial levels.

--the medical control commission has set the following objective for itself:

- a) to consider and to regularize the pensions of deceased veterans who were wounded during the liberation war, at the definitive rate of 100 percent.
- b) deceased veterans would not have to have their heirs provide the details of their applications. Legislation must be prepared for this purpose to benefit the heirs.

- c) reform commissions should facilitate medical expert procedures for older veterans.
- d) a proposed IPP base rate of 50 percent could be granted to veterans over 55 years of age, without needing to be submitted to medical reviews which take too long to complete.

The ministry at present is trying to make up for all accumulated delays, particularly in order to consider disputed applications, to avoid requiring the veterans to travel some distance to be heard. The definitive completion of action on pension applications is presently being achieved by harmonious medical and administrative action. The forthcoming resolution of the veterans' applications will facilitate and speed up consideration of other applications.

Regarding medical care, different proposals for the establishment of new centers are in the course of implementation. Their location will be in the vicinity of various hot bath centers: Hammam Bouhanifia, Hammam Essalihine, Hammam Zelfana, El-Kala Center, and Hammam Bouhadjar.

Concerning training and jobs, various regulations are either being prepared or are being applied. The following examples can be given in this connection:

- the organization of special classes to prepare the children of our martyrs for university study when they have reached third year in high school will begin to become a reality, beginning this year.
- broadening the priority of our martyrs' children for professional training in the different sectors of economic activity.
- expanding the opportunities for training for the children of deceased veterans and the children of seriously crippled, wounded veterans.
- regarding retirement, draft legislation has been prepared to improve further the pensions provided to veterans.
- for veterans still active, special provisions are contained in the regulations for the application of the general law of the worker, particularly as they concern the availability of jobs.
- at the organizational level tasks have been simplified with a view to facilitating the work of administrative employees.

Finally, it is appropriate to point out that the state has decided to provide aid to veterans in the form of loans. Thus, the appropriation bill for 1981 and a variety of decisions by the interministerial council encourage this kind of program. In fact this kind of action is aimed at a double goal: on the one hand to improve the situation of veterans and, on the other hand, to permit veterans having certain aptitudes and qualifications to make their contribution to the work of national development.

The object is to create the conditions for the transition of the veteran from his status as an assisted person to that of a party taking a role in the building of the national economy.

5170

CSO: 4519/50

VETERANS' GROUP HEAD STRESSES IDENTITY, REVOLUTION

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 913, 21-27 Aug 81 pp 9-11

[Interview with Youcef Yaalaoui, secretary general of the ONM (National Veterans' Organization), on the occasion of the celebration of the national holiday of 20 August, commemorating the general offensive of 20 August 1955, by Y O M, a REVOLUTION AFRICAINE staff correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of 20 August, REVOLUTION AFRICAINE had an interview with Youcef Yaalaoui, member of the Central Committee, secretary general of the ONM, in which he explains the political and historical meaning of this commemoration. He also raises with a member of our staff questions relative to the writing of history, to the situation in which Algerian veterans find themselves, and to the future concerns of youth.

[Question] Our revolution is celebrating the anniversary of 20 August 1955. Under what theme does the National Veterans' Organization place this event?

[Answer] First of all, we have to thank the Algerian press for the importance which it is giving to this historic event of 20 August. The theme under which this event is celebrated today is that of national unity and revolutionary continuity for the younger generation. It is therefore under this double symbol that the festivities marking this historic event will unfold. This event still contains the same meaning as in the past: it refers to our struggle, to our identity as a unit, and to revolutionary continuity. These are principles which made it possible for the Algerian people to persevere to final victory and, today, to put in concrete form the ideals for which the veterans fought.

[Question] What is the function of the veterans' organization in the mobilization of the soldiers of yesterday in the achievement of today's ideals?

[Answer] We consider that today's objectives must lead to the achievement of a better life for each citizen and the building of a healthy society, based on social justice and from which the exploitation of man by man has been banished. We veterans are acting and working for these principles and objectives and for their constant broadening and deepening. These are the principles which have guided the actions of men who have come out of the ALN [National Liberation Army] and the FLN [National

Liberation Front]. It could not be otherwise today, because it is this heritage and these ideas which the younger generation should take upon itself, take in charge, and perpetuate for the building of our society and of our nation.

[Question] Could you give us your views on the situation and on the evolution of your organization?

[Answer] The organization is going through a very favorable evolution. For those whose responsibilities do not permit their active presence within the organization, we must say that they still remain attached to the ideals of the organization. A considerable number of veterans are members of the organization, not to mention the fact that 80 percent of them are at the same time members of the FLN Party, are officials of the party and of the state.

We can say that, in terms of its structure and of the resolution of veterans' problems, the organization has gone through important stages and, within the party and the nation, holds the place proper to it and it is assuming the missions which have been turned over to it by the revolution.

[Question] Your organization has a very important role to play in writing the history of the national liberation struggle. It should, in particular, assemble the principal eyewitness accounts and documents, which are the bases for all historical work. What is the contribution of the ONM to this task, to which the congresses and the meetings of the Central Committee of the FLN Party attach particular attention?

[Answer] Today history is still not written on solid bases and in accordance with laws. Many things have been written, of course, but in a disorganized and not very rational way. Further, it is even more regrettable that it was foreigners, in particular senior officers of the colonialist army, who attempted to write our history from only their point of view, without any kind of objectivity. Further, other persons have written in their own name or for commercial motives suited to the interests of the publishers.

That is what has been done in this area--very little accomplished in a scientific, rigorous, and controlled fashion and without any mass distribution to the citizenry through the press, television and radio.

The fifth session of the Central Committee, in the framework of the application of cultural policy, has placed emphasis on this aspect of the need for the writing of history. We are going to organize a conference in the last week of October which will bring together historians, professors, writers, and responsible officials who participated in or experienced the liberation struggle, in order to study the ways and means of making a rigorous effort to write history. This meeting will constitute a beginning to provide the ideological bases and the human and material means on which this work should rest. This will involve questions such as the collection of documents, eyewitness accounts, the museum of the revolution, and regional and even local museums. It is necessary to leave to future generations the evidence of the greatness of their history, of their people, and of their nation.

[Question] Various efforts have been undertaken on behalf of veterans and of their heirs. How does the ONM envisage improving the situation affecting veterans?

[Answer] The conditions for an improvement in the situation affecting veterans come down to drafting the texts of laws and regulations. Various stages have been completed, and problems have been dealt with in terms of pensions, reclassification, and promoting the interests of veterans. The party, the state, the mass organizations, the various institutions--all of them have contributed to an improvement in the situation of veterans and their heirs. However, much remains to be done. It is difficult to wipe out and put an end to the heritage of colonialism, which sowed death and destruction during 132 years of pillage, 7 and 1/2 years of war, and which caused the death of 1 and 1/2 million martyrs. The will exists to reach durable and viable solutions to veterans' problems. A strategy exists today on this subject and it will lead to the completion, in a vigorous way, of the efforts and actions already undertaken.

[Question] What will be the future actions of your organization in the present phase of the mobilization of the energies of all those in active life in achieving the objectives of the revolution and applying the decisions of the party and of the organization itself?

[Answer] The essential role of the organization, according to the National Charter, is and remains safeguarding the values of the revolution and of the components of our national identity. We remain attached to these objectives while we undertake various kinds of action. Of course, this is in addition to the work of the organization in the activities of the FLN Party. For veterans a range of actions has been undertaken in terms of training, culture and professional guidance, and to improve the situation of veterans and obtain recognition of their legitimate rights.

[Question] Today's youth, called on to replace their elder brothers, the veterans who died on the battlefields, and carrying on a ceaseless struggle for the progress and well-being of the nation, have decided to continue, under other forms, the struggle which began on 1 November 1954. What message do you have for these young people?

[Answer] Our young people are dear to us. They are of our blood and, as is the case for all those who are dear to us, we wish for them their well-being and progress in terms of healthy and noble orientation toward the future. The veterans did not fight in order to live but rather in order to die, so that young people might live in liberty and dignity. Young people should attach themselves to this ideal and make it a reality in order to keep the promises of their elder brothers. Liberation is not only that of our country and of our fatherland. It is also the elimination of every form of alienation from one's own culture and the re-establishment of our language, our culture, our religion, our personality. Liberation is also that. Certainly, we turn the page on the past from time to time, but our youth, in order to follow the path of their elder brothers, must perpetuate the love of the fatherland and our Arab-Islamic values and must constantly feel the grandeur of their history. It is toward these ideals that we call upon today's youth to work with determination, without any withdrawal into themselves, nor shunning the outside world. On the contrary, the complete development of our youth demands an opening out toward the external world in order to learn and capitalize on the experiences of others, in order to open themselves continuously toward other horizons in our contemporary world. This is the way that our youth will continue the work of yesterday's youth. This is the message which we would like to address to them on this occasion.

ENERGY COOPERATION WITH JAPAN OUTLINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 41

[Text]

JAPAN'S wooing of Algeria as its biggest market in the Maghreb region is bearing fruit. The most significant recent development is the Algerian award to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of a \$54m contract to instal gas-lifting facilities in the Zarzaitine oil field.

The order, issued from Algeria's state-run oil corporation, Sonatrach, is still provisional and subject to formal approval by the Algerian government, due in September. It represents the second major construction order since the visit to Algiers by a powerful economic mission headed by Yoshihiro Inayama, president of Japan's Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), in April.

Inayama is reported to have had extensive talks with the Algerian finance minister, Mohammed Hadj Yala, for 'positive' Japanese involvement in Algeria's current five-year economic plan.

The first project contracted for on the basis of Keidanren's pledge has a \$270m petroleum gas liquefaction installation at Hassi Rmel, 650 km south of Algiers. It went to Kobe Steel through the Marubeni Corporation. The plant, to be completed in 1985, will liquefy 1.2m tonnes of petroleum gas a year.

Japan's Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) is to finance the export by providing a 'buyer's credit'.

Economic sources say that behind the Keidanren pledge of 'positive cooperation' with Algeria's economic programme is Japan's desire to cultivate Algeria as Japan's biggest outlet for commodities and technology in the Maghreb area. After the second oil crisis Japan, following its basic policy of diversifying its sources of oil supply, stepped up its search for other sources in Africa, Latin America and other areas.

It was only in 1980 that Japan imported any appreciable amount of oil and oil-related products from Algeria. Total imports from Algeria in that year stood at \$451m, close to an eight-fold increase from the \$57m of imports in 1979. In 1978, the total was only \$38m. Until 1980, trade between Algeria and Japan was one-sided in Japan's favour. Last year that trade was more or less balanced.

At the end of 1979, the cumulative total for trade cooperation amounted to \$108m, used for improving and expanding communications facilities.

Direct loans from the Exim Bank at the end of 1979 stood at \$588m. This was all committed to Sonatrach, for projects including gas processing.

CSO: 4500/1

SOLUTION TO LNG PRICE DISPUTE WITH FRANCE REPORTED NEAR

London 8 DAYS in English 29 Aug 81 pp 54-55

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

A SOLUTION to the bitter twenty-month row between France and Algeria over LNG prices is at last on the way, and could be officially announced at the November summit between Presidents Mitterrand and Chadli.

France, like the US, has refused Algeria's demand to link its LNG price to its high-grade crude oil on a heat-content basis. But during the visit to Algiers earlier this month by Claude Cheysson, France's external affairs minister, both sides agreed to work out a *modus vivendi*.

Since last spring Algeria has been fully honouring its two existing LNG contracts with the French utility, Gaz de France (GDF), but it warned it would make no deliveries for a third, and larger, deal before an acceptable compromise was reached. Algeria offered to change the initial indexation formula, by replacing as benchmark its own expensive crude with a basket of Middle East and North Sea oils. This would have reduced the price per million British thermal units (Btus) of LNG from \$7.07 dollars to around \$5.50.

The French, however, still find this too high. Under the old indexation formula they are still paying only \$4.25 per million Btus — and moreover are loath to accept the principle of gas-oil equivalence lest it might jack up the cost of future natural gas imports to an insupportable level.

Thus the task of hammering out a compromise solution will fall to a special 'committee of wise men' whose recommendations will form the basis of a new round of negotiations between GDF and Sonatrach.

French energy experts have warned their government about the cost of conceding too much to the Algerians. Firstly, they point out that excessive 'generosity' towards Algiers would immediately encourage Soviet negotiators to raise the ante in the current talks on the purchase of an additional 8bn cubic metres per year of Siberian gas, starting in 1985-86.

Also, an excessive rise in gas import prices can only boost French inflation, now running around the 16 per cent level. Since last spring, the average price of gas for French consumers has risen by 28.5 per cent. Finally, a higher gas import bill would add several hundred million dollars a year to the growing French trade deficit, predicted to be near \$15bn this year.

The two-year transitional energy programme, which will be presented to the French parliament next autumn, projects that natural gas will provide 17 per cent of the country's energy consumption, or 39m tonnes of oil equivalent, by 1990. Algeria is slated to supply about 20 per cent of this total.

The coming negotiations will undoubtedly be hardnosed, for President Mitterrand's personal adviser on energy matters is Gerard Renon, who previously represented GDF in gas talks with Sonatrach. Because of his often intractable position his Algerian counterparts dubbed him *Monsieur Non*. For all that, the political will to reach compromise on LNG is now evident on both sides. Indeed, French officials hope that a future Franco-Algerian LNG accord will serve as a model for more equitable North-South relations.

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

TALENZANE OIL EXPLORATION--France's state-owned Elf-Aquitaine oil company is to start exploration in September over 9,000 sq km of Algeria's Talenzane area, the rights to which were granted last September. Elf, though in partnership with the Algerian state oil and gas company, Sonatrach, will bear all exploration costs. Development costs and subsequent liftings will be shared, 60 per cent to Sonatrach and 40 per cent to Elf. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 47]

CSO: 4500/1

TWO-PART REPORT ON EGYPTIAN WORK FORCE AT HOME, ABROAD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 6, 7 Jul 81

[6 Jul 81 p 3 Part I]

[Article by Muhammad al-Barad'i]

[Text] First study of its kind reveals all the secrets of government employees.

How do they work? What do they produce? What are their difficulties and their dreams?

[What to do] before the Egyptian civil servant turns turns into a major puzzle inside government offices.

Working women now make up 16 percent of the number of employees.

Cairo has the lion's share of government employees; there are 708,000 employees in the offices of ministries: a rate of 40 percent of public service employees.

Civil servants achieve the highest degrees of learning while others in a grade two position are illiterate.

In the course of a lengthy journey inside government offices the Egyptian civil servant has turned into a major puzzle that experts have been at a loss to understand.

Cairo's share of civil servants has exceeded 40 percent of all the civil servants in the administrative agency. There is tremendous congestion in the ministries and in the public sector in the capital, and yet there are offices in the governorates without employees.

Women make up over 16 percent of the state's employees.

Despite their large numbers, one charge is being leveled against these employees: half or more than half of them are non-productive.

They are quick to respond, "We have many difficulties, and we want them to be remedied. [Remedy them], and we will give you a good product."

Experts who went out to every government office in Egypt said, "We have employees who have achieved the highest degrees of learning, and we also have people in grade two positions who are illiterate."

Experts have pinpointed all the secrets and difficulties of the Egyptian employee, and they have come up with a prescription to remedy all the ailments of the state's administrative agency.

How does the Egyptian employee's image appear to scientists and researchers now?

The features of this image as reflected by the most recent and the most important study prepared by manpower and planning experts of the duly authorized national councils indicate facts that are extremely dangerous and provocative.

There is an increase in the number of government employees that actually amounts to a surplus and supersaturation. At the same time there is also a shortage that is almost incapacitating in several locations and specializations, and there is a shortage in services as well which is not at all consistent with the growth in the number of workers.

There is also a distinguished rise in the standard of high-ranking, scientific proficiency. However, there is still a pervasive illiteracy which curiously affects a government employee in a grade two position.

There is a major rise in wages countered by an even greater rise in prices, and this is always putting a strain on the pocketbook of the government employee.

A few governorates are falling all over themselves to secure government employees at a time when greater Cairo is keeping to itself almost half of the state's workers. This is happening at a time of decentralization and administrative independence for every governorate!

There are facts that would turn the tables on many of the beliefs that are being held in the curious world of government employment. While a green revolution is breaking out over the black and yellow soil, the academic pendulum is swinging to indicate that there is a fearful surplus of agricultural engineers. At a time when we are about to be inundated with technology flowing to us in the climate of the open-door policy, we find that there is a noticeable surplus in many specializations among the graduates of industrial secondary schools and industrial apprenticeship programs.

What is even more curious than this and that is the fact that despite everything that has been said and is being said about the defects of theoretical education, there is a shortage among the graduates of [the schools of] law, literature and social service.

Let us take those facts and figures further and raise the question: what is to be done?

It may be that the principal objective that led the Manpower Education, Planning and Training Section of the National Council of Education and Scientific Research and Technology to embark upon this study was to clarify the characteristics of employment in the government sector, which is considered the primary beneficiary of the educational agencies' output, by measuring and classifying the government's work force, finding out about its development and finally deducing indicators and phenomena and making the necessary recommendations [accordingly] about the size and the development of government employment. The study indicated that the total number of civilian workers in the government sector in the beginning of 1980 amounted to 2,134,488 workers. Almost half of them were employed in local government and the rest in the central government and in public agencies. In 1979 the number of workers rose 137 percent over the 1965 figure while the total population rose 35 percent during the same period. This means that the relative increase in employment was four times that of the population increase.

Women make up a considerable percentage of the work force that comes to more than 16 percent. Most of the female employees are in the supply and domestic trade sector even though the nature of the work in those sectors requires that most employees be men. The percentage of working women in the culture and media sectors and then in the research and education sector is also high. The lowest percentage of working women is found in the insurance sector.

The number of employees varies from one governorate to another. Cairo heads the list of governorates since it has close to 708,000 public service employees in the government system. Thus it has close to 39.4 percent of the government's work force. It is followed by al-Jizah governorate with 7.8 percent, and tailing the list are the governorates of Aswan, the New Valley and the Red Sea. The reason for the high number of workers in Cairo, as the study asserts, is the fact that the central government is centrally located in Cairo and so are the vast majority of its public agencies. In addition, there are those who work in the general offices of Cairo governorate, in the sections of the governorate and in the services departments that are affiliated with the governorate of Cairo.

Regarding the employment situation, the number of workers who are actually performing the work amounted to 1,963,602 employees.

The numbers of those who are not on the job either because they are on loan or have been assigned [to another agency] or have special leave, academic leave or leave for military service amounted to 170,886 workers. Thus the ratio of those who are undertaking the work in the government system is 92 percent.

The ratio of people who are on loan or special leave rises with regard to specialized jobs, amounting to 4.5 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively. This is due to the fact that those who hold these positions have high degrees--physicians, engineers, accountants, etc. They are people

with experience who are in great demand. The ratio of scholarship recipients is also high in this group because of the expansion in scholarships for them. Desk positions come second as far as special leaves are concerned. Finally, there are the support services positions of office personnel and custodians.

Regarding the educational status [of the work force] the study indicated that the largest group in the work force is that with mid-level degrees; they make up 27.9 of the work force. This group is followed by a group of people with university degrees; they make up 26.4 percent of the work force. This group is followed by a group of people who have no degrees but who can read and write; they make up 22.4 percent of the work force. Then there is a group of people who have above average degrees; they make up 9.3 percent. Among them are people with below average degrees; that group is 7.3 percent. Then there is a group with graduate degrees, and that group makes up 6.4 percent of the work force. And in the last place there is a group of illiterate people who make up 4.3 percent of the work force.

Although the group of illiterates is last on the list, the study does indicate that the government system is still suffering from the presence of illiteracy. In 1980 the number of illiterate people was more than 91,000 workers. Their ratio in grade six positions is high, amounting to 17.4 percent. That ratio decreases gradually until it becomes 0.6 percent in grade two positions. These people are the remaining office personnel and craftsmen who have been in service for a long period of time and who benefited from the Employment Proficiency Laws.

Regarding the surplus and the shortage in the state's personnel system the surplus ratio in the colleges and institutes of higher learning amounted to 17.4 percent. As far as the other stages of education are concerned, the surplus ratio reached its highest in the commercial secondary schools, in the industrial and agricultural secondary schools and in industrial apprenticeship programs. The highest surplus ratio was among the graduates of agricultural colleges and institutes who represent 78.8 percent of the surplus university graduates.

The highest shortage ratio was among those who had the social service diploma and those with certain specializations, such as engines, machines, telecommunications and plumbing, in industrial secondary schools. There was also a similar shortage in certain specializations in industrial apprenticeship programs.

In comparing the development of the work force with the development of services the study focuses on what has already been mentioned about the large increase in the size of the work force in the government system. This increase amounted to 137 percent in 1979 over 1965. The study notes the change that took place in the same period in the standard and the volume of government services in government sectors that have a large number of employees. These are the education, health, agriculture, transportation, communications and social services sectors. The study indicated that, compared to the other sectors, the education sector achieved the highest rate

of growth in services. In general, however, growth in services was not consistent with the growth in the size of the government's work force. This means that the growth in the government's work force was due to other reasons. The most important of these reasons was the commitment to hire surplus graduates and those who were discharged from military service. More than 200,000 of those discharged from military service have been hired.

With regard to the development in wages and salaries across the board of the government sector, these increased from about 311 million pounds in 1965 until they reached almost 1.269 billion pounds in 1979. This is a rate of increase of 408 percent. By comparing the ratio of increase in average wages to the ratio of increase in the standard cost of living index in 1980, it is possible to conclude that the average real wage has declined.

And now what are the most important recommendations made by the study of the duly authorized national councils?

The study asked that the state design a policy for all the stages of education so as to effect the necessary balance between the output of education and the employment process. The study recommended that the future needs of graduates of colleges, institutes and schools that suffer from super-saturation be considered and that training agencies be stimulated so as to turn these specializations into those areas that are required by the labor market. The study recommended that females be directed to the kind of education that would give women the proper preparation they need to assume those positions that are suitable to their nature.

To confront the problem of 92,000 illiterate employees the study called for a plan whose purpose would be to wipe out their illiteracy in a suitable period of time by using positive and negative incentives. The study asked that a vocational training method be used to train office personnel and custodians for vocations and professions that are in short supply in the labor market.

The study also recommended that the Central Agency for Organization and Management be given all the authorities to prepare a manpower plan in the state within a certain period of time.

The study asked that the state reconsider the salary structure of those working in the government so as to make it as compatible as possible with the cost of living.

To solve the problem of state employees being concentrated in Cairo and to observe the decentralization policy, the study asked that rapid and firm solutions be devised to stabilize the central government's work force for a certain period of time that can be determined by agreement with the Central Agency for Organization and Management and the agencies of the government.

[7 Jul 81 p 3 Part II]

[Article by Khamis al-Bakri]

[Text] The first study to reveal all the secrets of a government employee.

The expatriate Egyptian employee: checks and balances in the Egyptian immigration market.

A curious fact: there are no specific files so far about Egypt's emigres.

Although experts studied for a long time the difficulties and dreams that the Egyptian employee has inside government offices, they also studied with care everything that Egyptian emigres suffer from--those people who immigrated to the countries of the world in search of better conditions of work and life.

According to the 1980 statistics about 10 percent of the total Egyptian labor force emigrated from Egypt.

In 1 year the Egyptian treasury has recorded over 3 billion dollars transferred in hard currency from those emigres. What is important [here] is [to know] how these Egyptian emigres birds are living in all the countries of the world. What are their difficulties? What are their dreams? How do we keep them attached to the mother country?

Is there a chart of Egyptian emigration showing its magnitude, its course, its advantages and its disadvantages? How does this emigration affect the labor mechanism inside Egypt?

The arrow of emigration has pierced through Egypt. In less than 20 years Egyptians' minds have changed. The Egyptian is no longer that peasant who is tied to the land by roots stronger than those of the old sycamore tree in his field. He is no longer that person who "stays put for a whole year so as not to cross a ditch."

The Egyptian now stands at the helm of ships that sail the high seas, and he stands at the helm of construction projects, factories, hospitals, schools, universities and even advanced atomic and space research centers.

A delightful study that was prepared by the Manpower Education and Training Section of the National Councils was issued a few days ago. The study fully explains the features of the question that is being raised.

--How has the Egyptian citizen changed? What has forced him to cross the borders?

The facts state that the Egyptian people are not migrant by nature. However, in the late forties immigration to the Arab countries began on a very small scale. People emigrated to work as teachers or in a few other professional occupations. In the early sixties when oil began to flow in

the Arab countries and when the economies of those countries began to develop, the demand for Egyptian labor to take part in the development plans in these countries grew stronger.

This was due to the abundance of professional labor in Egypt in addition to the cultural and social ties that link Egypt with these countries. There is no doubt that high wages in these countries were a principal reason for attracting this labor. In the mid seventies the number of emigrants increased sharply, especially after the 1973 October war. The rise of the price of oil helped the countries embark upon ambitious development plans that required increasing numbers of workers.

Egyptian immigrants abroad are divided into two kinds.

Permanent immigrants to a new land, specifically to the continents of Australia and America, and transient immigrants to the Arab countries. What about permanent immigrants?

Permanent immigrants are characterized by their small numbers, compared to transient immigrants. Between 1962 and 1969 there were about 31,500 permanent immigrants. In 1969 the annual number of immigrants came to 5,600. To the number of permanent immigrants one may add the number of academic scholarship recipients who refused to return. Their number amounts to 24,500 [scholarship recipients]. The danger of permanent immigration lies in the fact that among the permanent immigrants are highly qualified and well trained professionals and those who speak foreign languages fluently. Of the total permanent immigrants those who are in the employment age (from 20 to 39 years old) amount to about 17,000 persons. This age group is highly productive and has a long span of [productive] life. This explains why the new home countries insist on certain age groups of workers. It has been observed that 62.7 percent of those who immigrated permanently are technical and scientific professionals who have doctorate, masters and bachelors degrees such as physicians, engineers, agriculture specialists, university professors and scientists. They represent 16.2 percent of the labor force in Egypt. Because of the high educational standard of the permanent immigrants, they constitute a burden on the educational and training system because of the high investments that are necessary to prepare such professionals whose returns are then denied to the Egyptian economy. In fact the balance indicates that there is a loss as a result of the fact that those emigrants do not transfer part of their incomes to Egypt. At the same time the elderly among them receive pensions that are transferred abroad indirectly.

The fact is that after embarking upon the battle of prosperity, setting off the construction revolution and penetrating the desert, Egypt now needs all these specialties. However, because it believes in its duty to the Arab brothers, it has provided them with the full opportunity to meet the needs of the Arab employment market with Egyptian expertise. For example:

The shortage in graduates of civil engineering, architecture and electrical engineering departments amounted to about 39 percent of total graduates.

Nevertheless, the foreign demand was met by 2,358 engineers from the same departments.

As far as physicians and nurses are concerned, 3,054 physicians and pharmacists and 3,044 nurses have left the country. The shortage in accountants amounted to 40 percent; 8,765 of them left the country. Despite a 71 percent shortage in law school graduates 2,680 law school graduates and 882 specialists in employee affairs, most of whom are graduates of the law school also left the country. The shortage among graduates of the school of social service amounted to 69 percent of total graduates. Nevertheless, 1,149 social workers left the country. The shortage among librarians amounted to 99 percent. So far, the departure of 360 of them has been approved. The shortage in the number of graduates of the schools and institutes of foreign languages and translation exceeded 180 percent. Despite that, the Arab world has been provided with 479 translators. All this was done in 1980.

All this information leads us to a question about the effects of transient immigrants.

There are undoubtedly positive effects.

From a political standpoint the presence of large number of the Egyptian work force in the Arab countries after relations with these countries were severed has affected the continuation of close relations between Egypt and the Arab countries. This in itself is a gain.

From an economic standpoint the increased funds that transient immigrants transferred from their savings amounted to 3 billion [dollars] in hard currencies. This helped Egypt purchase the equipment and production requirements that were necessary to create new employment opportunities. These funds also reduced the burden on the state budget and enabled it to use part of its revenues to provide food security and to spend on domestic investments.

The contrived rise in the wages of people in some specializations and professions as a result of their emigration, followed by inflation and the rise of prices, led to the emergence of new classes and a radical change in the social structure. This forced the state to raise the salaries of the classes who were hurt by this situation and whose wages did not rise at a rate that would help them confront inflation. The state was also forced to increase the subsidy for a few essential goods; and it was forced to amend the tax law and the customs law, etc. in a manner that would ensure the redistribution of income and guarantee that the subsidy reach those who deserve it.

Naturally one of the most dangerous [consequences] of this emigration is the departure from Egypt of intellectuals and people with technical and professional experience. Training centers lose 40 percent of their trainees as a result of emigration.

Finally we come to the methods of remedying the problems that result from emigration. The efforts of the various agencies of the state must be joined together so that the following can be achieved:

1. A balanced, long-term development strategy is to be devised to meet the basic needs of the population. This plan is to depend on realistic investments so that the state would not have to change it every now and then, upsetting thereby all the considerations of the manpower plan and keeping us from achieving a real balance in the domestic employment market.

2. Detailed and complete data on labor turnover inside the country and abroad must be compiled. In addition, the reserve Egyptian manpower abroad in each country must be restricted by organizing the departure and entry of citizens in a manner that does not impede the freedom of movement that is guaranteed [to Egyptians] by the constitution.

3. A system is to be devised to ensure that education and training agencies receive data regularly and for a long period of time so they can provide the necessary investments to expand the specialties for which demand will increase and can provide the equipment, the devices, the teachers and the trainers that are necessary. At the same time they are to limit the number of graduates in those disciplines where there is a surplus if these agencies are to maintain their status. It is necessary to revise and develop the courses of study so as to make them compatible with the requirements of the changing labor market inside the country or abroad so we can guarantee improving the efficiency and productivity of workers and so we can guarantee that we can compete with the Asian labor force in the Arab markets.

4. Inasmuch as the state has not yet interfered in organizing the emigration of labor, a few Asian countries have found out the importance of exporting their surplus labor because of its numerous benefits. The most important of these are obtaining foreign currency receipts, reducing the pressure on their domestic markets and acquiring advanced skills. It is therefore recommended that the Korean system of work groups be studied. This system has conquered the Arab markets to the point that it is competing with Egyptian manpower inside Egypt itself and in the area of construction in particular. Egypt has been known for the abundance and the skill of its workers in that field. It has been the principal source of supply for the Arab markets.

5. It is recommended that the emigration law which is now being considered by the ministerial committee for services be issued promptly. This law includes:

--Devising a comprehensive policy for emigration and working abroad whose purpose is to make the best use of human resources inside the country and abroad.

--Unifying the laws to which emigrants and people who work abroad are subject.

--Preventing the exploitation of the work force or traffic in human resources.

--Ensuring and guaranteeing the rights of emigrants and people who work abroad and giving them useful incentives to break into this field.

--Establishing a firm and a close tie between the homeland and its citizens abroad through continuously flowing legal channels.

8592

CSO: 4504/58

EGYPT

COURT ACTION REGARDING GEN AL-SHADHLI'S RELATIVES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jul 81 p 12

[Article by Husayn al-Habruk: "Why Did the Court of Values Revoke the Travel Ban for the Families of the Defendants in the Case of Retired Gen al-Shadhli"]

[Text] Last Sunday the Court of Values headed by Justice Ahmad Rif'at Khafaji revoked the decision to prohibit the children of the defendants in the case of retired Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhli from traveling. The court granted them the freedom to travel. The court said that personal freedom was an established right that may not be curbed or diminished except for public interest and then within the limits of laws and regulations. The right to travel, which is a part of an individual's personal freedom, may not be taken away without due cause. None of the defendants' children is accused in the case that is now before the court.

The socialist prosecutor had asked the appointed justice at the Court of Values to prevent 15 children of the defendants from leaving the country. These defendants are accused in the conspiracy case in which retired Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhli and others are implicated. [The request was made] because of the requirements of the investigation which the socialist prosecutor was conducting. It had to do with the fact that the husbands and fathers of those persons were reported to have participated in a secret organization abroad whose objective was to overthrow the regime in Egypt by illegitimate means.

On 5 July the socialist prosecutor presented the travel ban order to the court and asked that it be extended. The court scheduled a session to consider the request during which the socialist prosecutor insisted on his request. Then the court ruled as stated earlier to revoke the prevention decision.

The court stated that it is an established fact that personal freedom is an established right that may not be curtailed or restricted except for a public interest within the limits of the laws and regulations. The court stated that the right to travel, which is part of an individual's personal freedom, may not be taken away without cause, opposed without good reason or restricted without justification.

To affirm this concept Article 13 of the International Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1948, stipulated that each person had the right to travel freely from one place to another within the borders of any country; that he had the right to choose a place of residence; and that he had the right to leave his country and to return to it.

Accordingly it becomes evident that preventing a person from leaving his country is a restriction on his freedom and a serious measure that affects that person's being in his capacity as an individual living in an advanced human community. Thus the imposition of such a restriction must be contingent upon causes that would require the taking of such measures. If these causes are non-existent, there can be no justification for the travel ban. Similarly, if there were justifications for such a measure and then the justifications therefor were removed, the need for the continuation of this measure ceases to exist.

Since there is written evidence that the ban against leaving the country had been issued during the stage of gathering the evidence in the case, and since this stage did come to an end after the socialist prosecutor turned the case over to the court on 25/6/1981 against 19 defendants none of whom is one of those persons against whom the travel ban had been issued, and since the case has been in court since that time, [the court found] that there is no justification for continuing the travel ban and therefore revoked it.

8592

CSO: 4504/58

ESCALATING TERRORISM SEEN UNDERMINING KHOMEYNI RULE

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Sep 81 p 5

[Article by Shahpur Haqiqat: "The Final Battle Will Pit the Supporters of Khomeyni Against the Disillusioned Former Supporters of the Imam."]

[Text] Since the fall of President Bani Sadr the escalation of terror and repression has accelerated in Iran. The fundamentalist clergy is plagued by almost daily attacks, exhausted by revolts of minorities, and by a war of attrition absorbing all their attention and which, intentionally or not, relegates to the background an ever deteriorating economic situation. Nevertheless the fundamentalist clergy relentlessly struggles against progressive forces and leftist groups, described as "Satan's children," "enemies of Islam," or "counter-revolutionaries controlled long-distance by international imperialism."

At the beginning of August (10 August 1981, in a radio broadcast speech) the Imam Khomeyni summoned the population "in the name of religious obligation" to keep watch over suspicious neighbors and report them to the authorities. "The government does not have the means to avail itself of an effective information system everywhere throughout the country. You, yourselves, should become government information centers. You should observe what the neighbors around you are doing. You keep tabs on them and they in turn will keep tabs on you, reciprocally,...Parents should check up on their children; not let them get out of touch; counsel them; if need be, report them to the authorities. This is a divine obligation. If you do not fulfill it, you will become accomplices of the conspirators."

Brought together under the sign of the Islamic Republican Party (PRI) [IRP], the violence of the fundamentalist clergy is to be explained by their determination to take over and maintain sole control over the key positions in the country. From the beginning their endeavor had been hampered by the sharing of power with the "liberal" and "moderate" bourgeoisie, generally hostile to instituting a theocratic dictatorship.

Unwilling to accept any obstacle to unconditional control over affairs of state the fundamentalist clergy immediately after the revolution had already more or less succeeded--with the complicity of the "liberals" for that matter--in eliminating the leftist groups who had extensively participated in the downfall of the imperial regime, and in harshly repressing the Kurdish and Arab rebellion. Subsequently, a slow and progressive elimination of the "moderates" became necessary. For this purpose the fundamentalist clergy, with support from the petty urban bourgeoisie,

In the economic field and in foreign policy, he made no real effort to change fundamentally the preexisting economic apparatus or even to challenge the capitalist structure of production, the principal basis of imperialist domination during the time of the Shah. On the contrary he was inclined toward a rapid resumption of economic and commercial relations with the West, with the same connections with international markets as in the past. He did not hesitate to exaggerate the communist danger and the threat of "Soviet imperialism" to justify this aim. Nevertheless emphasis was placed on cooperation and exchange with Japan and Europe, rather than with the United States.

Is it possible to underestimate Bani Sadr's involvement in the errors, deviations, and perversions of the current regime, in the political as well as in the economic fields? Perhaps it would be unjust to hold him entirely responsible in view of the constitutional limits which hampered his authority and the constant erosion of his power, particularly since on several occasions he spoke up courageously against the exactions of the mullahs, the summary executions, the absence of freedom of speech, the hegemony of "religious fascists" and their political shortcomings. However, these protests, at least until his fall, only aimed at the form, not the structure, of the regime.

Liberals' Setbacks

The fall of the chief of state was the result of a social conflict much deeper and more prolonged than it might appear: the frustration of certain categories of the "liberal" bourgeoisie and the Bazaar merchants who had vainly sought an occasion for a break with the regime. This category of malcontents was increasingly unwilling to support the imam's government and, having no interest in rejoining the monarchist opposition, after Bani Sadr's fall found a more "comfortable" alternative than the one offered by those harking back to the former regime.

The "liberal" bourgeoisie was pushed into the opposition by several factors:

1) Confusion and disorder in society

The proliferation of decision-making centers, the absence of a central government capable of controlling anarchy and the excessive and unexpected interventionism by the high Shiite clergy in the economy and in the state merely accentuated the disintegration of society. Moreover the "liberals" were by no means spared in the curtailment of liberties, the repression on all sides, the arrests, and the searches.

2) The absence of a plan to stimulate the liberal economy.

Economic bankruptcy went hand in hand with the disintegration of the political situation. To economic stagnation and growing unemployment were added the powerlessness and political shortcomings of the leaders. Moreover the establishment of a war economy provided the opportunity to the team in power to hide its inaction and shortcomings.

The economic paralysis harshly affected the Bazaar merchants; their interests suffered a great deal because of the stagnation in production and consumption. Bureaucrats and officers, accustomed to a middle class life, also saw their salaries

the under-proletariat, and the mass of unemployed, ceaselessly opposed the infiltration of "liberals" into the government, and restricted their influence in the economic structures of the country, although they had played a predominant role in providing training, and in financing and organizing the revolution.

Mr Bani Sadr's Policy

The first aim of the "liberal" bourgeoisie after the revolution was the return to calm and the rapid normalization of society, needed for an economic revival of the country. They were ready to form any coalition to protect against a possible over-running by the left. Thus, the first measures taken by Mr Bazargan, who shared these views, sought above all to reestablish order and security. His plan was to eliminate the institutions borne of the revolution, push aside Marxist organizations, and forbid strikes in the factories.

His fall, on 4 November 1979, was the first setback of the "liberals" and the beginning of the countdown that would lead one and a half years later to the fall of Mr Bani Sadr.

Either by conviction or in order to oppose the mullah's seizure of the country's key power positions, which was constantly undermining his power, Mr Bani Sadr soon took refuge in the "liberal" camp, adopted their views, and associated himself with their demands. In fact, his political views resembled those of Mr Bazargan in more ways than one. Despite his occasionally virulent criticisms of the latter's government, Bani Sadr, former activist of the National Front, later on did not hesitate to copy his methods, point by point.

From the beginning of his accession to the presidency in January 1980, he too sought to institute order and centralize power. He displayed a certain conservatism, favoring the safeguarding of existing institutions, slightly tinged by a few economic reforms. To contain the progressive forces, he threatened them with "exemplary punishment" if they did not respect the constitution. He approved the repression under way intended to "purify" Kurdistan, and defended, sometimes strongly, the traditional forces of the army.

Mr Bani Sadr made no secret of his views: a few days before his fall he stated to LE MONDE, "Only a strong president endowed with the broadest powers is able to govern a country like ours."

Even at the height of his power he took no steps in the direction of an opening toward the popular forces in the social field. He participated in the "purging" of the factories, favoring the abandonment of the shoras (local elections) in enterprises, whose existence had been tolerated by the constitution. He approved the laws adopted by the preceeding government forbidding trade union activity, and believed, like Bazargan and Khomeyni that "Those who incite workers to continue striking are guilty of treason..."

He bears considerable responsibility in the matter of the universities. At the end of April 1980 he proclaimed the "Islamic Cultural Revolution: in collaboration with the Revolutionary Council, and, on orders from the imam, he proceeded to the "cleansing" of the university establishment, but his real aim was to remove Marxist students from the University. The result was several dozen deaths.

reduced, sometimes by more than one half. Professors and teachers were unemployed since the closing of the universities.

3) Unexpected nationalization

It is true that some governmental decisions concerning nationalization of banks and insurance companies (June 1979), of automobile assembly plants, of mines, of steel, of food production industries (July 1979), and the pharmaceutical industry, were above all aimed at the upper bourgeoisie, but it also affected the "liberal" bourgeoisie. This wave of nationalizations threatened to affect foreign trade, the Bazaar merchants' resource of richness. This had been diverted away from them during the time of the Shah by businessmen and brokers. This was at the root of the great discontent and of the revolt of the Bazaar merchants. Moreover, the excessive ferment and the constant setting off of popular unrest in the name of Islam for a "social justice" and an "Islamic equality" frightened the affluent. Thus the radical clergy propagated a kind of "Hatred of the rich" climate throughout the population. For the have-nots, it was up to the rich to show how they got their richness.

If, despite the privations, the petty urban bourgeoisie and mass of have-nots remained on the whole favorable toward Khomeyni, it must be pointed out that a growing part of the bourgeoisie came to the conclusion that it would obtain nothing from this regime and that in order to prepare for the birth of another society more favorable to its interests and objectives, it should stand apart from the regime.

It is not impossible that by again posing as the defender of popular and ethnic demands, and concerned for freedoms and democracy, the "liberal" and "moderate" bourgeoisie may attract the majority of discontents and opponents of the Islamic regime, and in the absence of a solid popular organization assume leadership of the struggle and present a bourgeois alternative as a "reasonable" and necessary solution for the future of Iran.

Leftist forces have not hidden their fears in this matter. As of now, none of them (except the Mojahedin, who made a tactical agreement with Mr Bani Sadr) has come to the support of the Iranian ex-president's policy.

The Fedayin (minority), the Peyker, the Komaleh (Marxist-leninist Kurdish combattants), all hostile to the Khomeyni regime, consider that the fallen president was too much compromised with the regime in power; his alternative regime would be a mere "softer" extension of the Islamic Republic. But the audience of leftist groups is still not sufficient to make a counterforce. The chances of the monarchy in exile, because of its weak popular basis, are also thin, except at the price of a bloody coup d'etat. Everything suggests that the final battle will pit the supporters of Khomeyni against those who have stopped supporting the imam.

9772

CSO: 4619/34

BRIEFS

KIBBUTZ PRODUCTION STATISTICS--Today, the kibbutz population represents 3.5 percent of the total population of Israel, and only 21 percent of the total rural population. However, despite these relatively small numbers, the kibbutz sector produces around 40 percent of Israel's agricultural products and around 5 percent of its industrial products. This information was contained in a pamphlet on the kibbutz recently published by the publication service of the information center. The pamphlet includes chapters on the history and development of the kibbutz movement, its principles, patterns of kibbutz organization and management, lifestyle and the changes that have taken place. The publication also details the demographic and economic changes on the kibbutz which are interrelated to the extra-kibbutz system. The publication was written by Avshalom Rokeah and 20,000 copies have been distributed to shcools, educational institutions and to the public at large via local bureaus of the information center. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 81 p 3] 9811

COMPUTER ENGINEER SHORTAGE--At a meeting of engineering school administrators held this week, Mr Ostrovski, deputy general manager of the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI), reported on the anticipated shortage of computer and software engineers. Given the absence of an institution for training in the software field, the IAI runs a course in programming for senior engineers. The IAI also conducts courses on industrial trends, management and computers. Graduates receive a certified technician diploma from the Government Institute for Technological Training under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor Welfare, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Culture. In the academic year 1980/1981, 670 computer engineers were trained by the Institute through engineering schools. In the framework of engineering studies, 10 million lira were spent this year on the purchase of equipment for engineering schools where modern teaching methods are being used. The curriculum for computer engineers, including 2,500 hours of instruction and practice, is the only one recognized by the state certification bureau, in conjunction with the Institute and the Engineering Union. Graduates of the program present, in the course of their studies, an independent project which gives them real work experience in the industry. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 81 p 5] 9811

DECLINE IN JEWISH POPULATION--Between the years 1960-1979 the Jewish population in Israel declined to 83.9 percent while the non-Jewish population increased at the rate of one percent from 1974 to 1979. These data were released in a social report on Israel recently published by the information section of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. According to the findings of the report, which were based on the

Statistical Annual and other data, the Jewish population at the end of the year 1979 was 3,218,400 (83.9 percent), while the non-Jewish population was 16.1 percent (617,800 people). The report reveals that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of elderly people in the population, from 7 percent in 1969 to 9.4 percent in 1979. Further, the report indicates that between the years 1976-1979 there was a negative immigration balance of 126,464. The peak year of this negative immigration balance was 1974, with a net loss of 25,664 residents. It is also clear that the number of residents in the occupied territories declined between 1974 and 1979. This fact was due partly to the reduced birthrate. In 1979, the population in Yehuda and Shomron was 700,000. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Aug 81 p 1] 9811

DECLINE IN INVESTMENTS REPORTED--Investments in fixed assets (buildings, equipment and ground transportation vehicles), in fixed prices discounting for seasonal investments, declined by 4 percent in the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the previous quarter. Thus, the investment level for the first quarter was 2 percent lower than the parallel quarter in 1980. This decline was especially influenced by reduced investments in construction and ground transportation vehicles. On the other hand, there was a noticeable increase in the purchase of machinery and equipment. This was reported by a spokesman for the Central Bureau of Statistics and was based on provisional estimates formulated in the framework of the quarter-annual federal statement. The breakdown of investments by type of property, after discounting for seasonal influences, shows that for the first quarter of 1981 construction investments (housing, buildings and other construction projects in various sectors) were around 6 percent lower than in the previous quarter, and around 10 percent lower than in the same quarter of the preceding year. Investments in housing fell by around 3 percent, and there was an 11 percent decline in investments in buildings and other construction projects in the various sectors of the economy (agriculture, industry, etc.), comparing the first quarter of 1981 to the preceding quarter. Investments in private housing construction, in fixed prices, were the same during the first quarter of 1981 as in the previous quarter. There was, however, a significant decline in investments in public housing construction, which were off by 9 percent for the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the last quarter of 1980. The data from the Central Bureau of Statistics also point to an 18 percent decline in investments in ground transportation vehicles, in comparison to the last quarter of 1980. This decline was influenced by restrictions on the purchase of buses, down 30 percent from the fourth quarter of 1980. On the other hand, in the first quarter of this year purchases of other transportation modes (commercial vehicles, trucks, passenger vehicles purchased by commercial enterprises) rose by 30 percent as compared with the last quarter of 1980. Investments in machinery and equipment (locally produced and imported) on the part of various sectors of the economy increased by around 2 percent during the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the previous quarter, and by 6 percent compared to the same quarter last year. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 6 Aug 81 p 4] 9811

CSO: 4323/51

PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OPENS

PM180909 Beirut AN-NAHAR in Arabic 11 Sep 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "'Solidarity Conference' Opens Its Meetings, Concludes Saturday; 'Arafat: Begin Carried to America Plan Against the South; Ibrahim: We Are Not Against Real Solutions to Lebanese Crisis']

[Excerpts] Beirut--PLO executive committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat has declared that "Israel is preparing for a large-scale military operation in this south" and pointed out that "the Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin carried details of this plan with him to the United States." He stressed that the situation in the area is extremely grave and accused the United States of undermining peace opportunities by clinging to the Camp David accords.

'Arafat said this at the "world conference of solidarity with the Lebanese people and the Palestinian people" which opened its meetings yesterday with a debating festival at the Carlton Hotel. Those who addressed the conference were Yasir 'Arafat; Muhsin Ibrahim, general secretary of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement; Michel Kamil on behalf of the Egyptian "opposition movement"; 'Uman al-Hamidi, general secretary of the Arab People's Congress, and the representatives of Angola, Nicaragua and Cyprus.

The participants in the conference came from more than 30 countries, representing leftist organizations and popular and official bodies. There was a total of 200 persons from Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia who came in response to an invitation from the PLO.

At the opening session a steering committee was selected. This consisted of representatives from the world women's federation, the WFTU, AAPSO, the WPC, the WFDY, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, the Arab People's Congress, the Soviet Union, Eugene Johnson of the United States, Nicaragua, the African National Congress [ANC], Bangladesh, Angola, Mr (Silvester) from Italy and SWAPO.

Lebanese deputy Albert Mansur was elected chairman of the meeting. He welcomed the participants to Lebanon, "the land of confrontation and steadfastness," and said that "we highly appreciate your solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian people in opposing the Israeli aggression against our peoples and our Arab nation."

Addressing the conference the Angolan delegate said: "We cannot separate your revolution from our revolution, because it is an international revolution." He conveyed greetings to the participants from the African peoples. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, Boris (Viliniyev), chairman of the Soviet-Palestinian Friendship Society, greeted the conference, "which is being held in conditions under which the Israeli expansionists are continuing their attacks on the Arab peoples and the imperialist forces are continuing their military penetration of the area." He conveyed President Brezhnev's greetings to the participants.

Vassos Lyssaridhis, representative of the Cypriot delegation, then spoke. He said: "I refuse to be just an ally of the Palestinian revolution, because I am part of that revolution."

Olima Ramirez, head of the Nicaraguan delegation, conveyed to the participants the greetings of the Latin American peoples and said that "progressive movements in Latin America are committed to cooperation with all the liberation movements in order to counter Zionist propaganda and stand with the just cause of the Palestinian people."

'Umar al-Hamidi, general secretary of the Arab People's Congress, attacked the "reactionary Arab regimes that are waiting for American protection."

Michel Kamil, speaking on behalf of the Egyptian "opposition movement" said that al-Sadat's repressive measures against all the leftist and trade unionist forces, thinkers and university professors are a sign of "al-Sadat's bankruptcy." He said: "The Egyptian-Israeli peace depends on one man, and if that man goes the peace will collapse." He stressed that "our struggle in Egypt is an indivisible part of the struggle of the national liberation movement."

Speaking on behalf of Lebanon, Muhsin Ibrahim addressed greetings to the Egyptian people and said: "The countdown for al-Sadat's regime has begun. Egypt, which has always been in the forefront, will now be coming back to you to lead the Arab nation."

Referring to the situation in Lebanon, he said: "We are now in the midst of a political war which the United States is waging in order to take peacefully what it failed to take through war. In this war it is trying to infiltrate our people and our masses by portraying the nationalist movement's stand as intransigent and hard and by rejecting any solution as well as by insisting on keeping Lebanon embroiled in an endless civil war. We are not and we will never be against any genuine solution to this crisis. But today we cannot see any genuine solution or even an acceptable U.S. solution to the crisis, for the simple reason that the United States will not be able to impose its solution as long as we exist, as long as there are Palestinian revolutionaries and as long as Syria stands fast. What the United States wants is a separate solution for Lebanon that will achieve the interests of its agents."

'Arafat began his speech by welcoming the participants in the conference. He then talked about the fighting in southern Lebanon between and since the cease-fires, calling these clashes "the sixth war" and stressing that they occurred "within the framework of an all-out U.S. onslaught on our area."

'Arafat then spoke about the al-Biqa Syrian missiles crisis and the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor with the aim of "obstructing any cultural development in the area."

After reaffirming commitment to the cease-fire "from a position of strength, capability and commitment to international responsibility," he pointed out Israeli military concentrations and air and land exercises in northern Palestine and the Golan. He said: "They are preparing for a new large-scale operation. We must be alert and vigilant. The details of this operation were carried to the United States by Begin and Sharon. The situation is, therefore, extremely serious, and we must prepare ourselves for the future confrontations. We are facing great difficulties and obstacles that prevent us from achieving the just peace to which we aspire."

He attacked "the self-administration plan which constitutes a grave plot against our people and our consistent national objectives as well as perpetuating Israeli occupation of our territories."

'Arafat expressed the belief that "the area is facing an extremely dangerous and explosive situation since it is encircled by three U.S. fleets--in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf--in addition to the bases set up at Ra's Banas, Masirah, Berbera and Oman."

Concluding, he called for "action for the sake of an independent and bright future for our heroic Lebanese people, to achieve what they aspire to in their free, united, and independent homeland." He said: "Our people refuse rehabilitation and reject an alternative homeland. I say here on behalf of our people and revolutionaries that our struggle is for the sake of Palestine, for whose sake we are fighting and dying. It is for the sake of our beloved Palestine and our independent and free state, for which there is no substitute, and for our sole capital, holy Jerusalem."

CSO: 4404/5

OIL FOR GOODS BARTER DEAL WITH INDIA

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 631, 29 Aug 81 p 10

[Text] Libya has joined Algeria in proposing an oil for goods barter deal with India in a bid to counter pressure for a reduction in the official price of its crude.

In a report from Bombay, the FINANCIAL TIMES said last Tuesday that Libya had asked Kamani Engineering Corporation to accept oil instead of cash as advance payment for a transmission construction contract currently being negotiated.

The Bombay based corporation would not discuss the value of the contract but said it was one of two they were bidding for in Libya with a combined value of about 23 million dollars.

The advance payment would affect about 10 per cent of the value of the transmission contract. The matter has been referred to the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation for study, the FINANCIAL TIMES said.

The oil for goods proposal is the second to be made by a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in the last week. At the weekend Algeria proposed a similar barter deal with Japan.

They follow the failure of the OPEC oil ministers to agree on a unified pricing structure for OPEC crudes at their meeting last week in Geneva. At the end of the deadlocked meeting several ministers predicted that a number of the OPEC countries would soon be compelled by the market forces to cut their official prices.

OPEC's highest prices producers--Algeria, Libya and Nigeria--were expected to come under pressure to lower their levels, still eight dollars above the 32 dollars marker price charged by Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4500/3

BRIEFS

TEN AIRBUSES PURCHASED--The Libyan Arab Airlines, Libya's national flag-carrier, has signed a contract with Airbus Industries for 10 wide-bodied European Airbus jets of an undisclosed value. Reporting from Tripoli, the Libyan news agency, JANA, said the first two planes were due for delivery in June of next year, with the others following at a rate of two a year over a five-year period. According to JANA, LAA plans to carry 3.6 million passengers annually when the planes, and others on order, are delivered. Present operations provide the airline with some 1.5 million passengers annually. JANA did not specify the type of Airbus involved. The manufacturers make two versions of the twin-engined jet, one of which, the A-310, is favoured by other Arab airlines. The most recent Arab purchase of the A-310 was the \$350 million order for five aircraft by the Lebanese company, Middle East Airlines, which last month requested an extension of the contract to confirm the purchase because of financial problems besetting the airline. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 11]

AID TO NICARAGUA--Managua, 10 Sep--Libya has pledged its political and economic support for the Nicaraguan revolution, Daniel Ortega, co-ordinator of the Nicaraguan Government, said here on his return from Libya. Mr. Ortega, who also visited Algeria, said Libyan leader Moamar Kadhafi provided the plane he flew home in and the costs of the trip were borne by the Libyan Government. (AFP) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2827, 11 Sep 81 p 13]

CSO: 4500/3

KING HASSAN'S POLICIES EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 23

[Text]

Morocco's King Hassan has cautious support from most political parties for his peace initiatives on the Western Sahara, but faces growing criticism following June's widespread social unrest.

MOST MOROCCAN political parties have publicly expressed their confidence in King Hassan following his proposals of a ceasefire in the Western Sahara and a self-determination referendum at July's OAU summit in Nairobi.

The general feeling is that a peace solution must be found to the Western Saharan war, if Morocco is to put its economy back on its feet. But many politicians are nonetheless wary of Hassan's peace plan, fearing that the political tolerance of the past few years would gradually decrease once the palace no longer needed a broad national consensus for the 'recuperation' of the Saharan provinces.

The leading opposition party, L'Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), is divided over the peace plan. The majority, headed by Secretary General Abderrahim Bouabid, accepts the principle of a referendum, but claims that Hassan's OAU proposals opened a subject which they considered closed. A faction led by USFP

Parliamentary Spokesman Abdelouahd Radi has declared that the OAU resolutions on the Sahara, as published in the press, did not correspond to what was discussed at Nairobi. Radi suggests: 'Morocco should contest the OAU text, which does not reflect the spirit of the discussions which took place.'

Spokesmen for the nationalist Istiqlal Party, part of the government coalition, have said that if the OAU peace committee 'sets itself up as a tribunal, Morocco should not accept its findings'. The communist oriented Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) claims that 'a referendum in the Western Sahara is a mere formality, as it can only confirm the Moroccan character of the province.'

The rural-based Mouvement Populaire, also a member of the ruling coalition, is more circumspect. Its leader, Mahjoubi Aherdane, commented: 'I did not expect the latest turn of events. Is it right to ask a Moroccan if he really wants to be a Moroccan?'

The head of the recently created RNI splinter group Les Indépendants Démocrates, Khalli Henna Ould Rachid--state secretary for Saharan affairs--expressed confidence in the peace initiative: "It will allow us to distinguish between real and fake Sahrawis."

While there is a certain amount of support for the king on the Saharan issue, June's social unrest and the ensuing government crackdown may mark a turning point in internal politics.

Around 2,000 people were arrested as a result of the 20 June general strike, triggered off by massive price increases for staple foodstuffs and other necessities. Scores of trade union leaders and members of the USFP were arrested, as well as rioters, and USFP Parliamentary Spokesman Radi condemned "the policy of systematic repression which will lead nowhere, except to political bankruptcy."

The USFP and its allied trade union--La Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT)--have been hardest hit by government repression: 21 activists were condemned to a year of prison at the end of July, while another 26 received four-month sentences and 13 others were given six-month terms. More trials are expected.

Moreover, eight members of the USFP's national administrative committee were arrested plus 30 CDT officials and the secretary of the "Small Shopkeepers' Union." Two USFP journals--the Arabic-language daily AL MOHARRIR and the French-language weekly LIBÉRATION--were shut down. The PPS newspaper, AL BAYANE, was suspended until mid-July.

Relations between the USFP and the government had seriously deteriorated even before the riots. The party had boycotted communal elections in a number of provinces in May, in protest against the lack of guarantees for "free and fair" elections. USFP criticism of government economic policy, and charges of corruption and mismanagement, had exacerbated ill-feeling.

Some observers believe that the current wave of repression against the USFP goes far beyond the desire to cement the cracks in the home front to achieve an acceptable solution to the Saharan conflict. The USFP had threatened to walk out of parliament in protest against postponement of legislative elections for two years, by means of a constitutional amendment extending parliament's term from four to six years. The recent anti-USFP measures could be intended to make sure that the party's MP's are present when the new parliamentary session opens in October.

CSO: 4500/1

BRIEFS

LIBYAN EMERGENCY REPORT'S DENIED--Khartoum, 9 Sep--Sudan has derided Libyan reports of a state of emergency being declared in Khartoum, describing Libyan news agency reports of the situation as "ridiculous". The Sudan News Agency (SUNA), quoting an "authoritative source", said in a report Tuesday that "our people, who are leading their normal peaceful life in Khartoum, will learn from this new Libyan lie how deep the Libyan media has sunk into the swamp of lies". The source said that it was to make life difficult for Libyan agents in Sudan that "the security authorities are carrying out inspection raids", SUNA added. (AFP)--[Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2827, 11 Sep 81 p 12]

CSO: 4500/3

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

8 October

1981